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ON

PEACE.

BY

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CONSCIOUS of the diſguſt which muſt be excited in the breaſt of every true born Engliſhman at the idea of peace in ſo early a ſtage of the War, it becomes me to treat ſo delicate a ſubject with the utmoſt caution; nor will it, I truſt, be imagined, that I have aſſumed the Pen with the ſeditious view of perſuading my countrymen to ſheath the ſword, or that I dare to inſinuate, that the enormity of devaſtation which has characteriſed this war, ſhould be pleaded in diminution of its duration. That five hundred thouſand mangled corſes overſpread the fields of death, is a ſcanty portion of human miſery which can ſcarcely be expected to induce us to cloſe the bloody ſcene, and reviewing paſt occurrences, we are bound to expect that during ſucceſſive years, inſtead of ſucceſſive months, the full tide of the purple ſtream muſt flow, ere with ſullen and diſcontented minds we are willing to ſit down under the ſhade of Peace; for however diverſified may have been the motives or the pretexts for War, yet Peace never yet ſprang from any other ſource than a failure of the means of carrying on War. Were the objects for which it was commenced fully obtained, it was ſtill to be purſued for new objects of ambition or of intereſt: was the pretended danger which engaged us in War removed, new dangers ſtill terrified us from the thoughts of Peace: Was our adverſary defeated, the war was ſtill to be purſued until he was deſtroyed: were we defeated ourſelves, ſtill the thoughts of Peace were abhorrent to our nature, and War muſt be purſued without hope and without object. If ſuch has ever been our conduct, little ground can we have to look for Peace in the early ſtages of a War, avowedly termed by its great projector an *eternal* War, to be undertaken for the expreſs purpoſe of extermination.

Mr. Burke labours with ardour to impreſs on us the laudable purpoſe of exterminating our enemies; *Mr. Pitt*, indeed, ſeems to doubt the poſſibility of exterminating an armed nation, of extenſive popula-

tion, and poſſeſſed of immenſe reſources; but then he holds out to us the conſolatory idea, that if we cannot exterminate the French, we may be at length exterminated ourſelves. No ſituation to which we can be reduced, he ſays, can juſtify us in making Peace with the Jacobin Government of France, and he inſiſts on our continuing the War until our laſt guinea be ſpent, and the laſt man of us has fallen.

Abſurd in the extreme, therefore, is it to ſay, that the object of this War is unexplained: ſurely nothing can be more clear and more definite, than that you are to exterminate your enemies, or be yourſelves exterminated in the attempt: it is a clear it is a plain and obvious alternative; the firſt and greateſt good they place before you is the deſtruction of your enemies, the ſecondary and ſubordinate one is the deſtruction of yourſelves; and there is one advantage peculiar to this War, the object of it is certainly and infallibly attainable; for though even the powerful may fail in deſtroying their enemies, yet ſelf deſtruction is certainly within the graſp of the weakeſt.—The moſt deſpicable wretch on earth may provoke a powerful adverſary, and, without the leaſt proſpect of ſucceſs, may obſtinatly perſiſt in the combat; teaſe him with thruſt after thruſt, until he becomes neceſſitated to lay in the duſt an aſſailant he deſpiſes, merely to get rid of the trouble of parrying his imbecile aſſaults.

As doubts may poſſibly be entertained of our ever enjoying that great and ſupreme good ſo temptingly placed before us, the extermination of the French, our attention becomes naturally turned to the ſecondary one,—the extermination of ourſelves, and this may poſſibly be deemed, by ſome, an event ſufficiently intereſting, to demand a rather more accurate inveſtigation than it has hitherto experienced. That the War is to be continued until the laſt guinea is ſpent and the laſt man has fallen, ſeems to be a text ſufficiently important, to deſerve illuſtration; and much is it to be lamented that the ſame great man who favoured us with the one, has neglected to

furniſh us with the other: He might have informed us whether the laſt Guinea and the laſt Man were to be taken in a literal or in a figurative ſenſe.—— If only the latter, they were certainly undeſerving the emphaſis of his expreſſion and the energy with which it was delivered. In that ſenſe they muſt be equally applicable to moſt Wars; for if any ambitious project or partial intereſt be the object of any War, it is not to be imagined that it will be abandoned, ſo long as thoſe who engaged us in the War can obtain Men or Money, by any expedient which they can adopt with ſafety to themſelves. Let *Lord Hawkesbury* be aſked, whether the American War would not have been continued to the preſent moment if Men and Money could have been obtained for carrying it on? The people of this country have ever plunged into War with cruel and ſanguinary alacrity, but, alas! they always recoil long before the *laſt* Guinea or the *laſt* Man is exhauſted. However fond of deſolation and ſlaughter, they ſtill imagine they may be purchaſed too dear. The Miniſter however popular, or however firmly ſeated in power, at the commencement of a War, is always unhorſed, when, after ſucceſſive campaigns, he comes to demand the price at which the blood is to be purchaſed: ſome new faction then riſes into power who make peace, which ſome trivial circumſtance ſoon interrupts and the ſame routine takes place.

When *Mr. Pitt* tells us that the War is perfectly *unique*, that *all* is at ſtake, and *all* muſt be riſqued in its defence, he certainly means ſomething more than the ordinary reſults of War. The millions of *conſols* which *Mr. Pitt* has ſold have been purchaſed on the ſpeculation, that it is a commodity which will riſe when peace ſhall take place. The moment the Money Jobbers really believe that no peace will ever be made with France this reſource muſt fail. What mode muſt be then adopted? When no lure remains to obtain a voluntary loan, will a forced one be reſorted to? In what order will the remaining Guineas be put in a ſtate of requiſition? Will thoſe

which are derived from Places and Penſions be amongſt the earlieſt or the moſt remote claſſes?—— Surely it might alſo be excuſable were we to wiſh to be informed in what mode the *laſt* Man is to be obtained: What expedients are to be adopted to compell us to defend the *Bogs of Holland* and the *Woods of Hanover*, beyond the uſual gradations of lures held out to the weak; relief to the wretched; indemnity to guilt; or the more dreadful one of fraud and force ſpread over the land to ſeize every unhappy individual towards whom it may be imagined that fraud and force may be exerciſed with impunity. As the Jacobin Government of France has hitherto withſtood thoſe notable expedients to overthrow it, what additional ones are to be adopted?— When no hope ſhall remain of ſucceſs in carrying on the War and defeat ſhall follow upon defeat; If under ſuch circumſtances we aſk for Peace, will it be deemed a ſufficient anſwer to ſay, that a Man is yet to be ſeen walking in our ſtreets, or that there is a ſolitary Guinea which has not fled our land. Be it ſo. Harſh as this ſentence of univerſal Death may be deemed, it falls ſhort of *Mr. Burke's* malediction of *Eternal War*. *Mr. Pitt*, on the contrary, tells us, The world ſhall at length enjoy peace, when the laſt Engliſhman ſhall be no more. The world may then conſole itſelf with the hopes of ſeeing our iſland poſſeſſed by a leſs noxious race of *beings*, and its native Wolves again range through its dreary wilds. But ſtay. I had forgot. A more pleaſing proſpect opens to my view. Our well cultivated iſland ſhall not be abandoned to Wolves and Serpents. *Mr. Pitt* tells us, The laſt *Man* only muſt fall. The *Women* then, it ſeems, are not included in the bloody proſcription, and though no partizan of liberty and equality has ever yet condeſcended to conſider Woman as a part of the Human Race, although all their principles and ſyſtems of government, founded on the Rights of *Man*, have left the *Women* unnoticed, as though they had no exiſtence, yet ſurely, when the laſt *Man* has fallen, on *them* the

Government muſt devolve, and *Mr. Pitt* will hardly inſiſt on their purſuing the cruſade againſt French principles. It does not follow that they will look on French Republicans with *his* malignity. Should Citizen *Chauvelin* then viſit our iſland he may not find the unaccommodating Buckram of *Lord Grenville*. Should an embaſſy be then ſent to Paris, the French will hardly have ſo far forgot their ancient politeneſs as not to receive it with open arms, beſtow the fraternal embrace, and old animoſities forgotten, a union as firm as a family compact, may then take place, not founded on the fragil baſis of *diplomatique* arrangements, but built on the firm foundations of nature, and our Women may entertain ſentiments very oppoſite to the horrible exterminating ideas of *Mr. Burke* and *Mr. Pitt*. *They* may venerate the great firſt command given to Man, and, when the laſt Engliſhman ſhall have fallen, may conſider it as a duty devolved on them to look around for means to ſupport the tottering fabric of ſociety. The Thames and the Seine may entwine their branches, and even without a rape the *Romans* and the *Sabines* may become united. Thus at length, may I behold—No, alas! I am one of the proſcribed. *Mr. Pitt* has ſentenced me never to behold it, unleſs, indeed, I can hide myſelf in a corner, and like *Tom of Coventry* endeavour to get a peep.

But alas! vain are the views and projects of men, and more eſpecially of politicians! It is not merely the rich colouring of fancy, with which Hope gilds the horizon, and illumines the path of life, which proves evaneſcent. No! happily for mankind, the wild and malignant projects which are perpetually originating from mad ambition, are as often crumbled in the duſt, and *Mr. Burke's* eternal and exterminating War may be recorded to future ages, merely as a peculiar inſtance of deſperate and profligate malignancy; for whatever temporary calamities may reſult, no apprehenſion need be entertained of its leaving any more trace behind, than have

the mad projects of universal empire formed by a *Lewis* XIV. a *William* III. or an *Alberoni*.

Assuming then with confidence, that this War will not be eternal, but that, like other Wars, it must, at length, be terminated by Peace; and, whether we consider this as an evil to be deplored, or a good to be desired, it may not be improper to consider the various circumstances under which such an event may take place, and its probable nature, and consequences.

Not in the least meaning, by speculating on Peace, to arrest the career of War; admitting the propriety of *Mr. Jenkinson's* exhortations to commence our career as a military nation, considering manufactures and commerce as subservient, if not injurious to its spirit; I do not mean to insinuate that we shall fail in finally attaining all the explained and unexplained objects for which this War is prosecuted.—When I see *Young Jenkinson* abandon chuck-farthing to thump the table in St. Stephen's Chapel, telling us that *he has no difficulty in saying* that our object must be to break the crust of France, march to Paris, and destroy the Jacobin Club. I for my part, have *no difficulty in saying* that I am as confident that this plan will be effected, as *Henry Fielding* was that his Captain at *Rye* would perform his magnanimous Oath, of proceeding on his voyage to Lisbon in spite of the *Winds*, the *Waves*, and the *Devil*. After this solemn declaration of the orthodoxy of my faith in the success of this War, I must, however, admit that I may possibly be mistaken. It is *possible* that the present temporary reverse, as it is called, instead of being the mere fungus of a day, may prove to be an *annual*, a *biennial*, nay a *perennial*. It is possible that we may pursue this War as a desperate stake, abandoned by *Hope*, supported by *Despair*, and surrounded with *Disgrace*; and, if such should be the case, let us employ a few moments in examining the probable result.

There are some amongst us who, disheartened by our abandonment of *Flanders* and loss of *Valenciennes*, express their wish, for a safe and *honourable* Peace.—Absurd in the extreme. If when this War com-

menced we were exposed to the most imminent danger, a hundred fold must that danger be increased were Peace to take place under the present circumstances. Is it to be imagined that we should be now suffered to withdraw from the combat, crowned with honour? If in pursuing the War successive years had added to our conquests and our triumphs, we certainly should have expected our reward in a glorious Peace. If, on the contrary, defeat and disgrace have taken place it will become us, with fortitude, to expect the effects in any ensuing Treaty. No circumstance has tended more to protract our Wars than our uniform discontents as to the terms on which they have been concluded. It cannot, therefore, be deemed a useless speculation, to enquire what are the terms which may be expected, under respective given circumstances.

When we first thought proper to abandon a *dark, ambiguous, offensive* neutrality, and ring the changes on the *Scheldt*, *Savoy*, and *Avignon*; had we, instead of making the then state of things a pretence for war, been really desirous of restoring and securing the peace of Europe; had we, instead of being, as *Lord Grenville* properly calls it, un-accommodating to *Citizen Chauvelin*, condescended to enter into a real negociation with him, fully explaining the nature of the dangers we apprehended, and the terms we deemed requisite to secure us from them; and, on a compliance with those terms, had proposed an alliance for securing the peace of Europe; had such been our conduct, there is little doubt but that advantageous terms, fully adequate to such views, might have been attained. Peace and security were all that France could wish for: war could only be rendered palatable by being considered as the means of obtaining them; and the party then in power, even considered as a party, must have been interested in preserving a real and permanent peace; as the war threatened, and actually produced their destruction. Thus might peace have doubtless been ob-

tained, on the footing of national *security*, had such been our real object; but alas! the prospect of dividing or dismembering France was too tempting a bait to be abandoned for mere *security*. The Maritime part of France, the West India Islands, the uncontrouled domination of the East, however injurious the possession might have proved to the *people* of England, yet certainly to its ministers they must have appeared as prizes, for the obtaining of which every thing ought to be risked. If then we sat down to play for so rich a stake, surely, if the dye turns up against us, we must be content not only to lose the stake for which we played, but an adequate one of our own which we pledged against it. If, indeed, in an early period of the game, we had carefully calculated the chances, and found the odds against us, we might have manifested our dexterity by getting rid of a losing game by inducing our adversary to draw the stakes. If, when at the commencement of the war, we had, by various means, obtained possession of *Toulon*, *Valenciennes*, &c. instead of holding them out as eminent successes, sufficiently warranting a continuance of the war, we had calmly considered them as resulting from the impetus of the first efforts of an extensive alliance acting in perfect unison and in full vigour; had we considered how inconsiderable, in this respect they ought to have been viewed, that it was not probable that the same uniform vigour would continue to pervade such incongruous bodies as the courts which composed the grand alliance; that a proportionate degree of success, even had it continued, would have exhausted every source from whence such efforts could have been supported, long before any material object of the war could have been obtained; but that, on the contrary, the increasing energy of the French people rather portended the arresting our progress, and tearing the laurels from our brow: Had we carefully attended to these circumstances, we might, by surrendering conquests which could be of no

use if retained, and which there was no probability we should be able to retain, have made a parade of disinterestedness, procured the restoration of conquests in Savoy, have made a peace on the ground of the *statu quo*; and, perhaps have obtained some trifling advantages for ourselves. Nay, even when we had suffered this period to elapse, when the increasing energy of the French had destroyed our illusory prospects, when their myriads had expelled us from *Toulon*, forced the lines of *Weissembourg*, and overwhelmed us with defeat and disgrace before *Dunkirk*, even then the French might have wished to have been delivered from the necessity of making such terrible exertions, or, doubting of the certainty of their continuance, might have been willing to retire into the arms of peace, on the ground of the *statu quo*. But no period has since occurred in which such terms could reasonably have been expected. If, since that period, the union of the high allies has been broken, their measures deranged, their councils disordered, their armies mouldering away, and their finances ruined; if all the original assailants have abandoned the contest, and *England*, who had recently entered the field as an auxiliary, is become the sole principal; if her *Aucklands*, her *Spencers*, and her *Wyndhams*, are seen running up and down to whip in the stray cruisaders, and enlist a few thousand troops to be captured in fortress after fortress, or to rot in the bogs of Holland; and in this enterprize are become the dupes of Europe, cheated and laughed at from court to court; on the contrary, if France be seen with increasing strength and resources, trampling on all the barriers with which she is surrounded; the passes of the stupendous Alps and Pyrennees forced; the frontier fortresses subdued; pouring her armed myriads all around her; nay, what is more, if the commerce of England falls before her in an increasing proportion, threatening an annihilation of the only source which feeds and supports the war; then let us ask, what are the equitable

terms under such circumstances? If we possessed such advantages, would any minister dare to propose to abandon our conquests, or even to arrest their progress?

If Government, at a calamitous period, were to favour us with the blessings of Peace, ungrateful, in the extreme, would it be were we to murmur at those concessions being made to which the enemy, by the fair chance of War, had become entitled. If we, at the commencement of the War, with no foundation for our demand but delusive hope, insisted on *Indemnity* and *Security*, surely France, standing on her present eminence, has, at least, as good a claim. May she not reasonably insist on annexing to her empire such of her conquests as may tend to her security and advantage? May she not say, that experiencing the power of coalesced Monarchs, it is requisite, for her security, that a republican counterpoise should exist? That *Poland*, disposed to a republic shall be left undisturbed to form one, comprehending her ancient and most extensive limits, that France may at least have one Ally in Europe, standing on the same basis and united in the same common interest? and may she not also say, that England shall no longer disturb the peace of Europe with the wealth of Indostan: that she shall in future cease to possess the riches of *Asia*, unless her industry, her wealth, and her natural resources, will procure it her, through the medium of lawful commerce? If it be resolved to support the War beyond this crisis, it must be in confidence of a very great and extraordinary change in the aspect of affairs; whether there exists any visible cause adequate to such an effect some may doubt. If France attacked by all the great military powers of Europe, with a vigour and perseverance which was never equalled, has not only repelled their attacks, but by her energy, broken and dismayed the confederacy—exhausted their resources—weakened and dismayed with repeated defeats their numerous armies——if her ef-

forts have appeared to be, not as was predicted, a sudden and preternatural exertion, but that her resources have regularly increased, and manifested a stability unshaken amidst all the convulsions her Government has experienced —— if, indeed, England, standing alone and abandoned by her Allies, can stem this mighty torrent, take Spain, Italy, Germany, and Holland, under her protection, drive their enemies at all points back into his own territories, pursue him with her all conquering arm, and overwhelm him with her terrible vengeance; make France to its utmost limits tremble before her, lick the dust at her feet, and bend the neck to her yoke; then indeed may we justly claim *Mr. Jenkinson's* epithet of a military nation: *Almanza* and *Briuegua* shall be forgotten: *Fontenoy*, *St. Cas*, and *Closter Seven*, shall be consigned to oblivion: *Braddock* and *Burgoyne* shall be no more remembered: Then may we prepare to gather our well earned laurels, we shall desend to future ages, not merely as the Desolators and Oppressors of Ireland, the plunderers of Asia, the Kidnappers of Africa, and the base Slave-holders of the West: but crowned with Glory, eclipsing the triumphs of ancient Rome, and should out new ministers by buying men abroad, and ——— them athome, effect this mighty project, then the most sceptical amongst us will surely admit that miracles have not ceased. On the contrary, suppose all the puny efforts of a *Wyndham* to fail, in steming this mighty torrent; suppose defeat and retreat to become the order of the day, and yet that we persist in playing a desperate game, and venturing a deeper stake; then let us for a moment deliberate on the probable result.

Whatever degrading and opprobious language contending governments may pour on each other, with a view to inflame and stimulate their respective subjectsto aid them in effecting their ambitious projects, yet, does it not follow that villifying epithets,

and insulting recriminations must necessarily become an obstacle to a treaty of peace. When the parties become exhausted by War, they at length prove to be as unmeaning as those protestations of perpetual friendship and eternal amity, with which treaties of peace are always prefaced. But though words are no obstacle to treating for peace, yet actions may become such. If those who govern, or who may hereafter govern France, shall perceive that when all the great powers of the continent are disposed to abandon their projects against France (whatever they might be) as useless or as hopeless, and they see England stand forth alone to uphold the banners of war—if her emissaries are seen spreading over Europe to gather its scattered remnants, and fan the dying embers—if sustaining the war to the last shilling and the last man, appears to be not merely the tropes of oratory, but as bearing a real and unequivocal import, it then seems to follow, that every principle on which negotiation can ever take place is totally done away. No motive for France ever listening to terms of accommodation can then possibly exist.

Whatever disparity there may be between contending nations, however the events of war may have depressed the one or exalted the other; yet any negotiation for peace must proceed on the principle, that the triumphant has some ground yet remaining for fear, and the depressed for hope. The conqueror can have no motive for assenting to a treaty securing his conquests, unless those with whom he treats possess some degree of power, which may disturb him in the possession; nor will he enter into any compact which can circumscribe their extent, unless it be with those whom he supposes are in some degree able to stop their progress. The nation who has totally exhausted all means of offence and defence can therefore have no pretence to treat: she can only claim it on the ground that she has something which she can defend, or that there is something which she can gua-

rantee. If then we persist in this war, not on the ground of there being a *possibility* of success, but merely because we *can* continue it---if, weaker and weaker, we present a hostile front to our adversary until at last we can no longer even aim the imbecile stroke, and we lie breathless and unnerved before him; it will then be only for us to wait and see whether he will spare us from pity or contempt, or crush us from indignation or vengeance.

To those who shall survive the present conflict, so terminated, it may become an interesting circumstance to see what will be the conduct of France, in so new and important a situation. Will she say, behold the nation, who has long looked on us with unabating and implacable animosity; who has uniformly arraigned the order of Providence by stigmatizing us as her natural enemy; who, for above a century, had intrigued with all the powers of Europe to distress and to destroy us; who secure from the ravages of war, by her insular situation, had involved Europe in perpetual and bloody contests, that, while it was convulsed, she might seize all the commerce of the world: See the nation who, while the riches of our merchants were on the ocean, in confidence of the law of nations, swept the whole into her ports, and then dared to exult in the superiority thereby obtained: but, above all, see her who had long derived advantage from the ancient authority of her Kings being diminished, the oppressive jurisdiction of her Nobles annihilated, and the accummulated wealth of her clergy dispersed, yet were so dead to all the feelings of humanity as to insult us as slaves, because subject to the yoke; and yet when, with unprecedented energy, we had shaken off our despotism, were so far from encouraging us with her countenance, aiding us with her support, or assisting us with her advice, that when we looked anxiously around and solicited universal peace, she spurned our alliance, refused the office of mediator to sheild us from the horrors of war, looked on while the Despots gathered round us,

and at last headed the blood hounds of war, while her Senate, her Pulpits, and her Press, overflowed with such torrents of diversified base malignity as to excite a doubt whether the wickedness or the folly were predominant. See her now lie helpless before us. Shall we terminate her existence as a nation? shall Asia, shall Africa, shall America, rejoice in her destruction? shall she no longer contaminate the page of history, and disgrace the human species?

Whatever line of conduct the French may adopt under such circumstances, it is to be feared we have given them, by our conduct, too just a plea, and too strong a sanction. If we carried on the war to give them the blessings of our constitution, they may, if they chuse it, give us theirs. If we intended to give them a King, Lords, and Clergy, they may imagine they have as good a right to take ours away. If their interest prompts them to interfere in our internal Concerns, to arrange our Laws, our Government, and our Property, the speeches of Mr. *Pitt*, *Lord Mansfield*, &c. will be authorities to the point. If they wish to parcel out the nation amongst their friends, they may refer to our Treaties with our Allies; and should they wish for good Ports in the Channel, they may, to save the expence of making one at *Cherbourg*, keep possession of *Portsmouth* and *Plymouth*, and insist on choaking up the *Thames*, and refer us to *Dunkirk*, *Calais*, and *Gibraltar*. Perhaps, they may wish to make the fertile part of our island a potatoe garden; or they may think our pastures are fit to breed sheep, to supply with wool the French manufactures, and beef and pork to victual their navies; they may then drive us, like a herd of goats, into the mountains of Scotland, and Wales; call the rest of the island the French pale, shoot us like wolves and pole-cats, if we dare to enter it, parcel it out amongst the friends of the Committee of Safety, give the tythes to some French Atheists, on condition of their sub-

scribing creeds which every body know they laugh at; then they may send *Tom Paine* to govern us, and, if we murmur, they may point to *Ireland*. Should they happen to see our East-India charter, it may suggest the thought of selling the island and inhabitants to him, for half a million *per annum*; or perhaps, they may deem it more profitable were they to employ our Liverpool ships to convey all the young men, women, and children, and sell them to the people of France; the sale would diminish their debts, and furnish labourers to cultivate the vineyards, while their inhabitants, instead of working, might dance the *carmagnol*, and sing *ca ira*. In such case, they might find plenty of evidence, produced before a committee of the House of Commons by Lords, and Knights, and Squires, proving the miserable situation of the people of England, and how much they would be benefited by being made slaves.

But it is possible that some sublime and beautiful Orator, or some subtle Logician, may rise in the National Convention, and contend, with violence, for abſolute extermination. He may contend that English principles are detestable, and incompatible with all order and government. He may contend that to suffer a nation to exist, whose government, and whose laws, are derived from barbarous ages, and savage nations, is an example dangerous to civil society, Should he hear that an inclement season had destroyed our harvest, and that, without a large foreign supply, famine and pestilence must desolate the land, he might urge them to seize the happy moment, and, at one stroke, destroy those enemies to order and government. The advice might be adopted; our island might be declared in a state of starvation; and, as if infested with the plague, we might be cut off from the world, and all mankind prohibited from relieving our distress, and even this they may ignorantly suppose even a Royal Proclamation to have sanctioned.

If then we suppose that *French power*, combined

with *English principles*, may produce such effects, it may possibly be doubted whether it would be more calamitous if *French power*, if it becomes predominant, were to act on *French principles*. They, perhaps, may not prove so calamitous and so mischievous as some apprehend. Confraternity does not seem to be much worse than extirpation. Let half a million of fellow creatures in the *West Indies* tell us if there be not greater evils than even Fraternization. Cannot *Indostan* tell us that conquerors can overwhelm a country with more dire calamities than melting Church bells and seizing Church plate; and *Ireland* may, probably, imagine that the abolition of Tythes is not the most diastrous law which a powerful nation may impose on a weaker.

Should we at length fall into the hands of our enraged adversaries, after having for years poured out every degrading and insulting epithet on them, we may, perhaps, at length happily experience their falsehood; their conduct may even fall short of our present conduct in Indostan, they may not dissolve all the landed property of the kingdom, they may not dispose of the rent of every acre of our land among the miscreants whom France may vomit forth. It is possible, that we may find, that the principal evils we shall have to experience, may be those which the War produced, not those against which it was to guard us. We may find, that like the American Contest, we have involved ourselves in the calamities of War, to avoid ideal danger, nay that even unexpected benefits may result. Should the War terminate in depriving us of all our foreign dependencies, should the plunder of India no longer deluge our land, should our mart of slavery no longer exist, and should our Ministers be delivered from the thraldom of governing a neighbouring Island, should we behold in our Sovereign merely a King of Great Britain, and our House of Commons cease to be crouded with the representatives of West India Slavery or an East India Squad, it is possible that the change produced on our Government, our Laws, and general Polity may not prove extremely calamitous.—FINIS.

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